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Microfinance: NGO vs Banking
Sadaket Malik**
The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in microfinance (MF) needs reviewing from an operational perspective. Based on research of selective studies and experts’ opinion, selected literature on microfinance, and the author’s own experience over the last decade, this paper seeks to establish two main points. First, it asserts that with a few notable exceptions, the record of NGOs in mainstreaming microfinance is a modest one viewed from the context of NGOs as microfinance institutions (mFIs). When judged by the two criteria of success that much of the microfinance world has adopted – outreach to the poor and financial sustainability – the results are not encouraging [Nair 2001]. NGOs as mFIs have thus far had trouble achieving both objectives simultaneously. There is also little evidence of any aggregate impact on poverty reduction as the result of mFIs’ forays. The success of NGOs has however been laudable where facilitating and social intermediation criteria are applied. It is here that the author feels that the strategic partnership between banks and NGOs is poised to change the developmental intervention map of India. Second, the essay suggests that banks, for all their laudable work, will be making a strategic error in focusing on financial intermediation while ignoring partnership with NGOs. While microfinance is never easy for other types of institutions trying to practise it (e g, NGOs or credit unions), it is not, as will be explained, a field where a banker has natural advantages.
Why Partnership?
To the extent that banks incorporate NGOs’ activities in mainstreaming their self-help group (SHG) portfolios, they stand to gain. To the extent NGOs reorient their mission, vision and personnel towards the microfinance agenda, as a large number have done in the last decade, they risk drawing themselves away from work they are uniquely suited to do. Some of this work, moreover, would play a critical role in preparing the ground for mF among poor people. In other words, NGOs have to move away from pure financial intermediation to investing in human and social capital at the grass roots and bankers have to tap this invaluable experience of NGOs in mobilising, graduating and enabling rural communities. This will prepare the ground by enhancing credit absorption capacity of SHGs and enhancing their creditworthiness. The following account will explain how.In 1997, the World Bank’s Sustainable Banking for the Poor (SBP) project completed an ambitious survey. Until then those interested in microfinance had an intuitive sense of the movement’s growth, but no systematic attempt had yet been made to gauge its dimensions, nor look comprehensively at its results. The findings were unambiguous: NGOs acting as mFIs did not have any significant outreach vis-à-vis other financial institutions purveying microcredit.
Interestingly, commercial banks accounted for 78 per cent of the total number of outstanding microloans, and credit unions 11 per cent. NGOs accounted for only 9 per cent, and savings banks (which are not primarily in the credit business) just 2 per cent. Also, commercial banks accounted for 68 per cent of the total outstanding loan balance, savings banks 15 per cent, credit unions 13 per cent and NGOs 4 per cent. In terms of numbers of clients, commercial banks and credit unions showed significantly greater overall outreach than NGOs. While NGOs’ outreach, on average, was deeper, it was also narrow – NGOs reach some very poor people, but they do not reach many. On the other hand, credit unions and commercial banks also serve some wealthier clients so that their average outreach to the poor is not as deep. Still, the indications are that overall, credit unions and commercial banks serve more under-served poor clients than do NGOs.
This is not to rule out the role of NBFCs, NGOs with inchoate mFI activities or pure mFIs. The demand for financial services is high and as stated by the High Level Task Force on mF: “At least 25,000 bank branches, 4,000 NGOs and 2,000 federations of SHGs involving over 1,00,000 personnel of these institutions would have to be associated for scaling up and bank linkage of one million SHGs. Many of these NGOs will transform themselves into mFIs and will not only facilitate microfinancing, but will also themselves do the necessary financial intermediation. Similarly, many federations of SHGs will take on financial intermediation and act as mFIs.”
Indian TaleWe shift the focus to India.In the current context with over 4,60,000 SHGs credit-linked with banks, the SHG-bank linkage programme of microfinance has emerged as the biggest in the world. But besides banks, the major role played by NGOs in facilitating this transformation cannot be overemphasised. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) which plays a role in promoting and facilitating bank linkages while networking and coordinating the activities of all players in the field has underscored the crucial role played by NGOs as facilitators in purveying bank credit to SHGs..
The writing is on the wall. The success story has been to a great extent co-scripted by both banks and NGOs. However, it is pertinent to draw attention here to the vast network of rural banking outlets that precludes the necessity of a new breed of mFIs which as per experts’ opinion are ‘slow and expensive to develop’ [Harper 2002]. In fact as aptly put by Harper “the SHG system uses existing marketing channels, the banks, to bring formal financial services to a new market segment, the poor and particularly women”.
Relationship Banking vs Parallel Banking
The distinct bloodline of mF in India can be traced to this genre that is indigenously developed and called ‘Relationship Banking’ as opposed to the Grameen model of ‘Parallel Banking’ [Chavan and Ramkumar 2002]. The ground truth for SHG financing on a sustainable basis in India is that bank-linkage is the bottom line with exceptions proving the rule. Inherent to this success story but understated is the fact that NGOs have played a major role in effecting SHG-bank linkages. Relationship banking is the result of NGO-bank interface to leverage funds for SHGs. NGOs have achieved significant success as promoters (helping and enabling SHGs to access bank credit) and not as providers (direct purveyors of credit). This writer would juxtapose the SBP study’s evidence against NGOs in mF with their success as facilitators in India to make a case for NGOs as social scientists or change agents rather than financial intermediaries. The latter role is arguably the banker’s domain. Moreover, there are compelling institutional and regulatory factors which counsel against any such misadventures.
First and foremost there are legal constraints to NGOs acting as mFIs as noted by the Task Force: “Many NGO-mFIs are mobilising savings from their clients/ borrowers with the sole objective of inculcating a habit of thrift and savings among the poor and for enabling the use of such resources for acquisition of assets or linkage with credit from mFIs or banks. In the context of the amended Section 45 S of the RBI Act, the appropriateness of NGO-mFIs in mobilising savings is questioned. Although NGO-mFIs provide very useful financial services to the poor, including the opportunity to keep their very small savings safe, almost at their own doorsteps, they cannot convert themselves into other modes of constitution like NBFCs, banks or cooperatives due to various intrinsic constraints. Hence, NGO-mFIs may have to be given a special dispensation in regard to Section 45 S of the RBI Act. Accordingly, it is recommended that they be allowed to mobilise savings only from their poor clientele as part of the financial services provided to them and the same may not be treated as violation of Section 45 S of the RBI Act.”
The ‘intrinsic constraints’ noted above are not difficult to guess. Moreover, some NGOs that are mobilising savings purely may also face other risks. The problem for NGOs in dealing with savings is that from a risk-bearing standpoint, savings mobilisation and microcredit are not the same. That is why the law treats them differently. From the client’s point of view, the risks of saving with an NGO are masked by their growing confidence as NGOs show that they are here to stay. But NGOs are not in most cases operating in regulatory environments that permit them to mobilise deposits; they do not benefit from deposit insurance nor can their operations be controlled by bank supervision agencies. And when covariant risk is high, as it is when group members are all from the same sector and necessarily from the same community or locality, the tenuousness of the NGO position is even more dangerous to the saver. Besides propriety and prudence, savings custodianship necessitates statutory provisioning and creation of reserves to cover liquidity and other risks.
Credit MinimalismWhile ‘savings only’ is a limited disaster story, the other side of the tale relates to NGOs who are employing ‘credit first’ or minimalist credit principles. When savings form part of the basis for credit in a financial institution, that institution does not have to take a problematic, often tortured, path to sustainability; it starts out on a more naturally sustainable path. But, NGOs have gone into microcredit with donor monies, and aim towards sustainability without, in most cases, the enormous benefit of voluntary savings mobilisation. In short, sustainability in NGO-run programmes is hobbled from the start. It looks as if the poor want its product (credit) less than they want savings, and all by itself, credit does little for productive asset creation.
The one-shot single dose attack on poverty is the sustainable development planner’s biggest nightmare. A case in point is CARE’s Credit and Savings for Household Enterprises (CASHE) project in India which is more of a lending programme than a sustainable financial institution. Unfortunately the credit and non-credit financial needs of the clientele community are expected to outlive the six year shelf-life of one of the most ambitious projects in micro-lending to hit Indian shores. The flawed-in-conception status is palpable from the fact that the CASHE budget does not include an income generating component for skill-building. The best intentions are to give a shove across the poverty line without imparting financial sustainability to households or providing for repeat finance.
The incompatibility between the tendency of NGOs to upscale (for sake of grant continuance) and financial sustainability is aptly summed up by William F Steel, World Bank consultant, according to whom, “Grant-based methodologies are poorly suited for financial intermediation, especially providing credit funds (for which recovery, not disbursement is most critical)”. The other type of NGOs turned MFIs with both credit and savings services have a limited success which as the SBP study has shown is nothing to write home about in terms of outreach or sustainability. Many are facing teething problems while a few have folded up.
These dysfunctional aspects are further highlighted by Kanta Singh (WISE Development Authority) during a CARE-sponsored case study of its CASHE programme: “Low size of loan and long cycle time for loan disbursement are reported to be the largest irritants. Many groups that have successfully managed loans in the past lose energy when they do not get subsequent (credit) linkages.” Absence of training and handholding on income generating programmes are felt to be a major gap in the CASHE design by SHGs. This need is also felt by (partner) NGOs who are trying to increase loan demand and the ability of SHGs to handle larger loans.In India the demand of the poor for safe and liquid savings instruments is very high. In fact, NGOs, with their sensitivity to the poor and intimacy with individuals, overcome the trepidation that illiterate and destitute villagers harbour about bank personnel (not known for their civility). The World Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), part of whose mandate is to help microfinance institutions improve performance, has concluded “…most microfinance clients want to save all the time, while most want to borrow only some of the time.”
However, NGOs face a dilemma when savings overstrip credit demand, i e, interest paid out drastically cuts the margin from interest income. Their limited expertise and avenues for investing elsewhere compound this problem. CARE/Guatemala’s Village Banking Programme fuelled by donor monies, expanded lending outreach heavily in 1994. As a result outstanding loan balance grew at an annual rate of 78 per cent between 1993 and 1995. By contrast, voluntary savings mobilisation grew during the same period at an annual increase of 215 per cent.
Trade-Off TribulationsThe record from the SBP cases (a score of which were NGOs) suggests that as NGOs in microfinance, often encouraged by donors, come to accept the two goals of sustainability (subject to tough measurements) and outreach, (measured increasingly by loan size as a per cent of GNP per capita) the following trade-offs and adjustments are observed:(1) Concentrating portfolio growth in high population density areas (thus focusing less on rural areas).(2) Emphasising rapid initial loan volume growth, leading to poor portfolio quality.(3) Keeping field staff salaries low (or alternatively raising the number of clients per loan officer) in order to control costs, thus tending to high turnover and low morale.(4) Moving towards the retail trade and service sectors with high cash flow that enable high repayment rates, thus tending away from manufacturing and fixed asset lending.(5) Emphasising short-term loans as a strategy for high repayment and loan size growth, thus eliminating cyclical sectors like agriculture.(6) Tending to move up the poverty scale away from the very poorest in order to maintain loan demand and repayment rates (75 per cent of the SBP NGO cases showed this ‘upward creep’).Competitive Advantage of NGOsNGOs have a crucial role in group formation, nurturing SHGs in the pre-microenterprise stage, capacity building and enhancing credit absorption capacities. Group-based forms of lending (e g, solidarity groups, village banking) originated mainly for the benefit of the lender as solutions to two problems faced by microcredit organisations: (i) the problem of lack of collateral, and (ii) the problem of high transaction costs involved in loan appraisal, monitoring and enforcement. In theory, the group serves as a set of co-guarantors operating through peer pressure and the group members’ incentive to keep each other solvent so that they themselves do not lose the opportunity to receive a loan. The group serves also as a way to get around imperfect information, since members of the group know each other. Thus the transaction costs involved in loan appraisal are reduced if not eliminated.
It is here that NGOs play the crucial role in transforming the atypical destitute village woman with two children to fend for into a responsible individual with group commitments and group resources. This is a fact repeated in village after village. Whether NGOs empower women in thrift and credit groups is a moot question but it is an empirical fact that such groups provide effective ‘coping mechanisms’. Peer pressure is the best collateral. The banker in India needs to recognise that high repayment rates of SHGs is not an inherent structural feature of SHGs but a commitment to group values. The role of NGOs in investing groups with values through human capital is an undeniable specialisation. In the words of economist Jagdish Bhagwati: “Those values (of civil society and of democracy) are better advanced…by the political and financial support of the numerous and growing NGOs, both here and abroad, that work ceaselessly to nudge the world in the right direction.” The banker must accept that this is a role which the NGO, as a committed social engineer, is better suited to execute. This is not to deny qualities of empathy, humanism, social engineering to bankers. But the stark truth is that there is a need for a sensible division of labour. If bankers want to reach the poorest with financial services, they need to face certain realities. First, what they are doing is poverty lending and not economic development or enterprise development. Second, they should realise what the likely impacts may be. Changes in people’s lives will be immediate in terms of lightening the burdens of poverty, but small loans to the poorest will not bring them permanently out of poverty.Arguably, banking is more of a system than an art. Unarguably, working to facilitate the productivity of small businesses is really an art. And again, because of their grass roots orientation, because of their commitment, because they are less bureaucratic and encumbered than large development assistance organisations, NGOs are capable of overcoming a subtle but important barrier to successful facilitation – the ‘packaging of knowledge and skills’.
Once again, this is no case for discouraging NGOs from mF but to emphasise the role of emotional capital which will bring in an element of quality. The more NGOs, who are in microfinance, face the challenge of helping to bring about an increased articulation of the parts and the players in a local economy, the more they may need to get involved in such non-financial services. The effects of such services are difficult to measure in the short run. But NGOs can take on such tasks, many already do so.Thus, NGOs will fill up an important void in quality at the grass roots level which will help the poor not only to borrow but also to become good investments for banks. This will help boost business at rural branch level and cover up inadequacies and constraints that might hamper a banker with the conflicting demands of his workload. Many banks and FIs have recognised the role of NGOs and have effected suitable policy initiatives. A larger recognition of this need is reflected in the statistical evidence on linkage patterns, which we have cited earlier (see the table), which establishes NGO-bank partnership over the Indian mF spectrum. A truer recognition at individual banker level might lead to business sense replacing customary scepticism for NGOs. This will be the strategic turning point in making India’s relationship banking a showpiece and paradigm for the world’s NGOs and bankers.
The author is a freelance columnist based in Jammu and Kashmir***and can be contacted at sadaketmalik@rediffmail.com

As the banking industry continued to hemorrhage in 2008, 25 U.S. banks failed. Among them were Washington Mutual and IndyMac, the first- and third-largest bank failures in U.S. history, respectively, but there were also scores of smaller regional banks throughout the nation.

According to the American Bankers Association, 98% of the nation’s 8,500 banks are considered well capitalized, making the chance of any one bank going bankrupt highly unlikely. Still, bank failures increased markedly in 2008 and will likely continue in 2009 under current economic stresses.

Most U.S. banks are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), so in the case of a bank failure, any one individual’s bank deposits, up to $250,000 at any individual institution, are protected by the FDIC. (The coverage limit, which Congress increased last year due to the banking crisis, will remain in force at least through December 31, 2009, but may then revert back to $100,000 if Congress takes no further action.)

But what happens to your mortgage, car loan or credit card account if the bank that loaned you that money goes out of business? Could their loss be your gain?

Unfortunately, you are still on the hook for any and all debt you have incurred. If your bank fails, you’ll need to pay close attention to how you handle your loan payments in the ensuing months.

Here’s what to do:

1. Continue making your monthly payments on time, and as usual. Don’t fool yourself into thinking that the upheaval of a bank failure is an excuse to skip payments. Doing so will only hurt your credit, as late payments will be reported to the credit bureaus; if you skip payments on a credit card account, late payments could also increase your interest rate.

In the event of a bank bankruptcy, the FDIC will assume control of the bank until it finds a stronger bank willing to buy the assets of the failed bank. Because your loan is a legal contract, neither the FDIC nor any bank that buys the failed bank can change the terms of your loan, and you, as borrower, are still bound by the same terms to repay the loan as originally agreed

Credit card account terms, however, are not fixed like a house or car loan. If another bank purchases a failed bank’s credit card accounts, the new bank is not required to honor the interest rate or other terms of the original account, like annual fees, over-limit fees or late fees. Still, it’s in the new bank’s interests not to reshuffle the deck, because making radical changes could trigger an exodus as the old bank’s credit card customers reject the new terms en masse

In short, most credit card holders won’t notice any changes in how they can use their cards, but if you could be considered a borderline credit risk by the takeover bank, it’s possible they’ll change your account terms or even close it. Cardholders with a high credit score have the least to worry about.

Financial planner and author Suzie Orman advises keeping copies of your cancelled checks and loan payments for at least six months following the takeover of your bank to avoid potential problems if your payments aren’t recorded during the transition. (If that were to happen, you would then need to check your credit report to ensure the takeover bank has not reported your payments as late or delinquent.)

If you’re already delinquent on your mortgage payments, there’s a chance that bank foreclosure proceedings will be temporarily stopped, giving you a chance to negotiate an agreement on payments that help you stay in your home.

2. Read your mail and any correspondence concerning your bank’s failure. It’s important to be aware of any changes regarding to whom you write your checks and where you mail them, but continue writing your checks and mailing payments to the same address until you are notified otherwise. Be careful, bank failures represent another opportunity for scammers looking to steal money from unsuspecting bank customers by concocting bogus emails or websites redirecting your payments.

Check the FDIC website for specific details on how accounts and loans at each of the banks that failed in 2008 are being handled.

Although the FDIC insures bank accounts, experiencing a bank failure when your personal savings are involved is still unsettling, and most customers would prefer to avoid that possibility altogether. To protect yourself:

1. Be sure your bank is FDIC-insured.
2. Be sure that your deposits at any one bank, whether they’re certificates of deposit, money market accounts or savings and checking accounts, don’t exceed the $250,000 FDIC coverage limit.
3. Be cautious about opening any one-year or longer-term CDs that exceed $100,000 before December 31, 2009. Unless Congress acts to continue the extension of the FDIC coverage limit to $250,000, a CD over $100,000 may not be fully insured after that date.
4. Check the strength of any institution with which you’re considering banking by visiting an online bank rating service. Although many bank failures can’t be anticipated, understanding the overall strength of your bank can be helpful in assessing the risks.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD OF BANKS

                                                                     *G.JAYALAKSHMI., Ph.D Research Scholar

INTRODUCTION 

India’s banking industry is at a watershed. Evidence from across the world suggests that a sound and evolved banking system is required for   sustained economic development. India has a better banking system in place Vis a Vis other developing countries, but there are several issues that need to be ironed out.

A strong performance in the current year, strengthening the positive trends of the past, will certainly improve the short-term risk perception but focus must rest on key structural changes that have to occur if Indian banking is to be a positive force and not a drag on the rest of the economy.

It has met and successfully overcome several challenges over the last decade. But bigger challenges lie ahead. In this paper, we try and look into the challenges that the banking sector in India faces.

Interest rate risk

The first and most obvious challenge will come from rising interest rates. The current perception is that interest rates have stopped falling and are likely to remain steady, but if demand for resources picks up as firms start to invest in new capacity and boom conditions fuel consumption demand, then there may be a tightening of liquidity and upward pressure on interest rates.

Interest rate risk can be defined as exposure of bank’s net interest income to adverse movements in interest rates. A bank’s balance sheet consists mainly of rupee assets and liabilities. Any movement in domestic interest rate is the main source of interest rate risk.

            Over the last few years the treasury departments of banks have been responsible for a substantial part of profits made by banks.

Now as yields go up (with the rise in inflation, bond yields go up and bond prices fall as the debt market starts factoring a possible interest rate hike), the banks will have to set aside funds to mark to market their investment. This will make it difficult to show huge profits from treasury operations. This concern becomes much stronger because a substantial percentage of bank deposits remain invested in government bonds.

Banking in the recent years had been reduced to a trading operation in government securities. Recent months have shown a rise in the bond yields has led to the profit from treasury operations falling. The latest quarterly reports of banks clearly show several banks making losses on their treasury operations. If the rise in yields continues the banks might end up posting huge losses on their trading books. Given these facts, banks will have to look at alternative sources of investment.

Non-performing assets

The best indicator of the health of the banking industry in a country is its level of NPAs. Given this fact, Indian banks seem to be better placed than they were in the past. A few banks have even managed to reduce their net NPAs to less than one percent (before the merger of Global Trust Bank into Oriental Bank of Commerce, OBC was a zero NPA bank). But as the bond yields start to rise the chances are the net NPAs will also start to go up.

This will happen because the banks have been making huge provisions against the money they made on their bond portfolios in a scenario where bond yields were falling.

Reduced NPAs generally gives the impression that banks have strengthened their credit appraisal processes over the years. This does not seem to be the case. With increasing bond yields, treasury income will come down and if the banks wish to make large provisions, the money will have to come from their interest income, and this in turn, shall bring down the profitability of banks.

Capital adequacy norms

            A third and a key challenge will be the introduction of Basle II capital adequacy norms. These will make two demands on banks.

They will have to measure the risks they bear much better. For this they will need to overhaul their management information systems so that they have a clear and quantifiable idea of their risks.

            Then they will have to look for capital to back that risk and ultimately earn enough to be able to service that capital. R Ravimohan, managing director of Crisil, feels that the future is all about technology and risks.

There is a huge potential for undertaking risk assessment by using technology. It is imperative for banks to grow but the key issue is deciding where and how.

            New ways or managing risk and asset-liability mismatches, like asset securitization, which unlocks resources and spreads risk, are likely to be increasingly used.

Competition in retail banking

            The entry of new generation private sector banks has changed the entire scenario. Earlier the household savings went into banks and the banks then lent out money to corporate. Now they need to sell banking. The retail segment, which was earlier ignored, is now the most important of the lot, with the banks jumping over one another to give out loans.

The consumer has never been so lucky with so many banks offering so many products to choose from. With supply far exceeding demand it has been a race to the bottom, with the banks undercutting one another. A lot of foreign banks have already burnt their fingers in the retail game and have now decided to get out of a few retail segments completely.

The nimble footed new generation private sector banks have taken a lead on this front and the public sector banks are trying to play catch up. The PSBs have been losing business to the private sector banks in this segment. PSBs need to figure out the means to generate profitable business from this segment in the days to come.

Conclusion

Over the last few years, the falling interest rates, gave banks very little incentive to lend to projects, as the return did not compensate them for the risk involved. This led to the banks getting into the retail segment big time. It also led to a lot of banks playing it safe and putting in most of the deposits they collected into government bonds.

Now with the bond party over and the bond yields starting to go up, the banks will have to concentrate on their core function of lending.

The banking sector in India needs to tackle these challenges successfully to keep growing and strengthen the Indian financial system.

            Furthermore, the interference of the central government with the functioning of PSBs should stop. A fresh autonomy package for public sector banks is in offing.  The package seeks to provide a high degree of freedom to PSBs on operational matters. This seems to be the right way to go for PSBs.

            The growth of the banking sector will be one of the most important inputs that shall go into making sure that India progresses and becomes a global economic super power.